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1 Introduction
Securitization of conventional home mortgages began in 1970 with the founding of
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.1 The proportion of mortgages held
in market-based instruments rose steadily from 20% in 1980 to 68% in 2008.2 Earlier
evidence indicates that securitization has been growing at least since 1975 (Ja¤ee and
Rosen [21, Table 2]).
Remote lending has also grown. Petersen and Rajan [28, Figures I and II] nd
an upwards trend in distances between small rms and their lenders that began in
about 1978 or 1979 and continued through the end of their data in 1992. The mean
borrower-lender distance in a sample of small business loans studied by De Young,
Glennon, and Nigro [13, pp. 125-6] rose from 5.9 miles in 1984 to 21.5 miles in 2001.
Remote lending of residential mortgages also rose from 1992 to 2007 (Loutskina and
Strahan [23, p. 1477], discussed below).
We present a tractable theoretical model that links securitization and remote
lending. We assume that banks have hard information about all loan applicants
but soft information about only local applicants. Without securitization, banks lend
only to local applicants because of a winners curse. With securitization, in contrast,
ignorance is bliss: the less a bank knows about its loans, the less of a lemons problem
it faces in selling them.3 This enables banks to compete successfully for some remote
applicants.
Our model yields many predictions that are consistent with prior empirical ndings
(section 5.1):
1. Securitization Stimulates Lending. As in Shin [32], securitization leads to
1A detailed history of securitization appears in Hill [20].
2The source is unpublished data underlying Figure 3 in Shin [32].
3In a prior empirical paper, Loutskina and Strahan [23] point out that banks may have an
incentive to lend remotely in order to avoid private information at the time of securitization.
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expanded lending by connecting liquid investors with loan applicants. There is
considerable evidence that the securitization boom in the 2000s led to expanded
lending (Demyanyk and Van Hemert [12]; Krainer and Laderman [22]; Mian and
Su [24]).
2. Securitization Favors Remote Lending. In our model, banks lend remotely
only if they can securitize their loans. Moreover, a bank securitizes all of its
remote loans but only some of its local loans. Loutskina and Strahan [23]
nd that as securitization rose, the market share of concentrated lenders - those
which originate at least 75% of their mortgages in one MSA - fell from 20% to 4%
from 1992 to 2007. Moreover, concentrated lenders retain a higher proportion
of their loans. Finally, when they expand to new MSAs, these lenders are
more likely to sell their remote loans than those made in their core MSAs.
3. Remote Borrowers have Strong Observables but High Conditional
Default Rates. While a bank might lend to a local applicant who has a
low credit score in our model, it will not do so for a remote one whose credit
score is all it sees. Hence, remote borrowers tend to have stronger observables
than local borrowers. (We use borrower to refer to an applicant who gets
a loan.) On the other hand, since banks lack soft information for remote
applicants, they make worse lending decisions: conditional on observables,
distant borrowers are more likely to default.4 Loutskina and Strahan [23,
p. 1456] nd that concentrated lenders (dened above) have lower loan losses
despite lending to applicants who are riskier in terms of loan to value ratios.
Agarwal and Hauswald [1] nd that applicants with strong observables tend to
apply online for loans, while in-person applicants tend to be those with weaker
observables but positive estimates of the banks soft information about them.
4This empirical implication is also present in the prior theoretical model of Hauswald and Marquez
[18], which we discuss in section 6.3.
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Moreover, online loans default more than observationally equivalent in-person
loans. De Young, Glennon, and Nigro [13] nd that banks that lend remotely
have higher default rates.
4. Securitization Lets Borrowers with Strong Observables Get Cheap
Remote Loans. In our model, securitization encourages banks to lend to
remote applicants with strong observables. They must o¤er low interest rates
to these applicants in order to prevent cream skimming by the applicantslocal
banks. In contrast, banks can demand high interest rates from quality local
applicants whose observables are weak since these applicants cannot get remote
loans. This has two empirical implications. First, the securitization boom in
the 2000s should have strengthened the (negative) relation between borrower
observables and interest rates. Rajan, Seru, and Vig [30] nd that borrower
credit scores and LTV ratios explain just 9% of interest rate variation among
loans originated in 1997-2000 but 46% of this variation among loans originated
in 2006. A second implication is that remote borrowers pay lower rates.5
Agarwal and Hauswald [1] nd that internet loans carry lower interest rates
than in-person loans. Degryse and Ongena [8] nd that interest rates decrease
with the distance between small rms and their lenders in Belgium. Mistrulli
and Casolaro [25] nd the same relation among business lines of credit in Italy.
5. Securitization Raises Conditional and Unconditional Default Rates.
Securitization encourages more remote lending in our model. This raises default
rates conditional on borrower observables. Securitization also makes lending
more protable in general, which encourages banks to lower lending standards as
in Shin [32]. For both reasons, the unconditional default rate also rises. These
predictions are conrmed by empirical research. Rajan, Seru, and Vig [30] nd
5The comment in footnote 4 applies here as well.
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that conditional default rates rose between 1997-2000 and 2001-6.6 Demyanyk
and Van Hemert [12] nd that conditional and unconditional default rates rose
from 2001 to 2007.7
6. Securitized Loans Have Higher Conditional Default Rates than Re-
tained Loans. In our model, local banks adopt lower lending standards in
local areas that are more protable to securitize. Hence, securitized loans have
higher default rates than retained loans conditional on observables. Krainer
and Laderman [22] nd that controlling for observables, privately securitized
loans default at a higher rate than retained loans. Elul [15] nds that securi-
tized loans perform worse than observationally similar unsecuritized loans, and
that the e¤ect is strongest in the prime market.
In our model, securitization has mixed e¤ects on social welfare. It raises the sup-
ply of funding for worthwhile projects by connecting liquid investors with deserving
loan applicants. However, it also leads to an ine¢ cient loan allocation by giving
banks an incentive to favor remote applicants with strong observables. For instance,
consider two applicants in the same location. One has a high credit score but a
negative NPV project. The other has a low credit score but a positive NPV project.
A remote bank would favor the rst applicant since evaluating a projects NPV re-
quires soft information, which it lacks. A local bank may prefer not to fund either
applicant because it knows too much about them, which makes their loans di¢ cult
to sell. Hence, funds go to the negative-NPV project, which is clearly ine¢ cient.
6They control for the loan interest rate, credit score, loan to value ratio, and dummy variables
for adjustable rates, prepayment penalties, and whether the lender lacked documentation of the
borrowers income or assets.
7Their controls include the loan interest rate, borrower credit score, loan to value ratio, debt to
income ratio, local changes in house prices and unemployment since origination, and dummies for
prepayment penalties, owner-occupier status, and low documentation.
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We treat securitization as an exogenous innovation that encourages remote lend-
ing. If instead securitization were initially possible and an exogenous barrier to re-
mote lending were then lifted, our model would also predict a simultaneous increase
in both remote lending and securitization.8 In practice, legal barriers to interstate
banking fell gradually starting in Maine in 1978 and ending with the federal govern-
ments passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching E¢ ciency Act of 1994, which
abolished all remaining restrictions (Loutskina and Strahan [23, pp. 1451-2]). Since
securitization was invented earlier, these barriers may have fallen partly in response
to pressure from large banks who were eager to increase their securitization prots.
Alternatively, their fall may have been due to an exogenous change in regulatory
philosophy. This is an interesting topic for future empirical research.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Section 3
analyzes a base case without securitization, while the full model is studied in section
4. The models predictions are discussed and illustrated in section 5. Section 6
reviews related theoretical literature, while conclusions appear in section 7.
2 The Model
A country consist of two ex ante identical regions, A and B, each containing a single
bank. We will refer to the bank in region A (B) as bank a (respectively, b). Each
region R 2 fA;Bg consists of a continuum of locations ` 2 [0; 1]. In each location `
there is a continuum of agents. All participants are risk-neutral.
Each agent has a project that requires one unit of capital and pays a xed gross
return of  > 1 if it succeeds and zero otherwise. The projects success probability
8Since we assume banks lack private information about their remote loans and have a lower
discount factor than investors, banks securitize all of their remote loans. Since - in our model -
they securitize only some of their local loans, removing a barrier to remote lending would raise the
proportion of loans that are securitized.
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is the product of the agents unknown type  2 (0; 1) and a macroeconomic shock
SR` 2 (0; 1) to the agents location ` in the region R in which she lives. Project
outcomes, conditional on these success probabilities, are independent.9
There are four periods, t = 1; 2; 3; 4. Period 1 is the lending stage. The banks
see signals of each agents type  and then make competing loan o¤ers to the agents.
This stage determines which agents borrow from which banks, and at what interest
rates. Period 2 is the security design stage. Each bank decides which loans to
securitize and what liquidating dividend to pay as a function of the returns of these
loans. Period 3 is the signalling stage. The bank in each region R rst sees signals
of its local macroeconomic shocks SR` . Each bank then chooses how many shares of
its security to sell to investors. Period 4 is the settlement stage: project returns
are realized, successful borrowers repay their loans, and each bank pays a liquidating
dividend to holders of its security.
The local shock SR` has the form
SR` =
KX
k=1
Rk`
R
k : (1)
For each k, Rk 2 (0; 1) is a random variable that is realized after the security is sold
and Rk` 2 [0; 1] is a constant satisfying
PK
k=1 
R
k`  1.10 We refer to Rk as the
kth local factor in region R and to Rk` as location `s loading on this factor. For
instance, each factor may represent an industry and the factor loading may be the
share of a locations workforce that is employed in the industry.11 In each region R,
the distribution of the factor loading vector
 
Rk`
K
k=1
across locations ` 2 [0; 1] has no
atoms.12
9That is, a projects success probability is SR` regardless of the outcomes of other projects.
10One can include a constant term in equation (1) by assuming that one of the factors is a constant.
11Factor dependence within and across regions is permitted, as detailed below in section 2.1.3.
12That is, there is no factor loading vector that receives a strictly positive probability weight.
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At the beginning of period 1, both banks see a public signal spub 2 (0; 1) of type
 of each agent. Simultaneously, the agents local bank also sees a private signal
spriv 2 (0; 1) of .13 The joint population distribution of the type , signals spub
and spriv, and location ` is given by a known distribution function F and associated
continuous density function f on the domain (0; 1)3  [0; 1].
The assumption that F is region-independent is purely for notational convenience.
It could be replaced by region-specic distribution functions FA and FB with no
change in the results, except for the proliferation of region superscripts throughout
the paper. The same is true of all distributions derived from F . In particular, we
will also use F to denote the marginal and conditional distribution functions of these
variables or subsets of them; for instance, F (jspriv; spub; `) denotes the conditional
distribution of  given spriv, spub, and `. The corresponding densities are written
with fin place of F, and we assume that all such densities are continuous.
We assume that an increase in the public signal - or in the private signal conditional
on the public signal - raises the conditional distribution of  in a rst-order stochastic
dominance sense. This is formalized in the following two assumptions. The rst
says that an increase in the public signal weakly lowers the probability of observing a
type  below any given threshold, and strictly lowers the average of these probabilities
across thresholds. Moreover, this e¤ect is bounded above. The second property is
like the rst but relates to the e¤ect of the private signal on the distribution of types
conditional on the public signal. (In both cases, we also condition this distribution
on the location `.)
Public Signal Monotonicity For any signal spub 2 (0; 1) and location ` 2 [0; 1],
there are integrable functions    : (0; 1) ! <+, such that the integralR 1
=0
 () d is strictly positive and for each  2 (0; 1), the derivative @F(jspub ;`)
@spub
exists
and lies between   () and   (), inclusive.
13The outcome of the model will not depend on what the applicant knows about her own type, as
the applicant simply borrows from the bank that o¤ers her the lower interest rate.
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Private Signal Monotonicity For any signals spub; spriv 2 (0; 1) and location ` 2
[0; 1], there are integrable functions    : (0; 1) ! <+ such that the in-
tegral
R 1
=0
 () d is strictly positive and for each  2 (0; 1), the derivative
@F(jspriv ;spub ;`)
@spriv
exists and lies between   () and   (), inclusive.
Let  = E [jspub; `] d=  (spubj`) denote an agents expected type given her public
signal and location; let  =  1E [jspub; spriv; `] d=  (sprivjspub; `) denote the propor-
tional change in this expectation that results from learning her local banks private
signal.14 By the Law of Iterated Expectations, E (j; `) is identically equal to one.
Henceforth, we will work directly with  and , which we refer to respectively
as the agents credit score and private type. The following result states that (a) the
credit score is strictly increasing in the public signal and (b) conditional on the public
signal, the private type is strictly increasing in the private signal. Moreover, both
rates of increase are bounded.
Claim 1 The functions  (spubj`) and  (sprivjspub; `) have slopes (with respect to spub
and spriv, respectively) that are strictly positive and nite.
Claim 1 has the following useful implication. Let us say the pair (; `) is feasible
if the location ` is in [0; 1] and the credit score  lies strictly between supspub  (spubj`)
and infspub  (spubj`). All feasible pairs have a nite, strictly positive probability
density:
Claim 2 The pair (; `) is distributed according to a nite density g which is strictly
positive on the set of feasible pairs (; `).
Let the distribution function of (; `) be denoted G (; ). Let the conditional
distribution function of the private type  given the credit score  and location ` be
14The symbol  d=denotes a denition.
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denoted H (j; `). With probability one, the support of H (j; `) has a nite supre-
mum `.15 We assume that H is not too concave, and its concavity is nondecreasing
in :
No Cream Skimming Let H 0 and H 00 denote the rst and second derivatives of
H (j; `)with respect to . For all feasible pairs (; `) and for all  in the
interior of the support of H (j; `), (a) these derivatives exist and (b) H 00=H 0
is greater than  1 and is weakly increasing in .
This property will imply that if bank a (for instance) lends to some agents with credit
score  in location ` in region B, then bank a prefers to charge an interest rate that
is low enough to deter bank b from lending to any agents in this group. Hence, in
equilibrium bank b does not cream skim: lend to agents with high private types 
but not to all agents. This fact allows us to solve analytically for the interest rates
that the banks charge for every credit score, location, and region. It is consistent
with the observation of Agarwal and Hauswald [1] that internet lenders charge low
rates partly in order to prevent cream skimming:
Arms-length debt is less readily available but carries lower rates be-
cause competition among symmetrically informed banks, which rely on
public information, not only drive down its price but also restrict access
to credit to minimize adverse selection. [Agarwal and Hauswald [1, p. 2]]
The following result shows that No Cream Skimming is equivalent to a particular
assumption on the primitives of the model.
Claim 3 Let F 0 and F 00 denote the rst and second derivatives of F (sprivjspub; `)
with respect to spriv. Let  0 and  00 denote the rst and second derivatives of  =
15Since   1, ` is no greater than 1=. Since  > 0,  = E (jspub ; `) is strictly positive for
any spub that occurs with positive probability. Hence, 1= is nite with probability one, so ` is
as well.
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 (sprivjspub; `) with respect to spriv. Assume these derivatives exist. Then No Cream
Skimming holds if and only if, for all spriv, spub, and `, F
00
F 00   
00
[0]2 is greater than  1
and is weakly increasing in spriv.
The following property states that for any given public signal, one can nd private
signals that are strong enough that make an agent at least as appealing as any other
agent. For instance, if an agent with several loan delinquencies (the public signal)
has just inherited a large enough sum of money (the private signal), a bank can ignore
her weak credit history.
Limit Irrelevance For any public signal spub, location `, and " > 0, there exists a
private signal spriv for which E [jspub; spriv; `] > 1  ".
This will imply that a remote bank lends to applicants whose credit scores exceed
a location-dependent threshold.16 Indeed, Agarwal and Hauswald [1] nd that the
chance that a bank will approve an online loan is increasing in both the applicants
public credit quality and the banks internal assessment, but the latters e¤ect is
very small. Limit Irrelevance permits the depiction of our results using simple two-
dimensional diagrams. We also consider what happens in the absence of this as-
sumption.
We now produce an example that satises all of the above assumptions. Suppose
that spriv, spub, and ` are independent and each is uniformly distributed on the unit
interval.17 This implies that F (sprivjspub; `) = spriv, so F 00 = 0. Let the conditional
distribution of  given the two signals and location be F (jspriv; spub; `) =  m1 m where
m = 1 (1  spriv) (1  spub). The mean of this distribution, E (jspriv; spub; `), equals
16Without Limit Irrelevance, a bank may o¤er loans in a given remote location to applicants with
credit score 0 but not to those whose credit scores are 00 > 0.
17This refers to the closed unit interval in the case of ` and the open interval in the case of spriv
and spub .
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m. Hence,
 (sprivjspub; `) = E (jspriv; spub; `)
E (jspub; `) =
1  (1  spriv) (1  spub)
1  1 spub
2
;
so  00 = 0 as well. No Cream Skimming then follows from Claim 3. Limit Irrelevance
holds since limspriv!1E (jspriv; spub; `) = 1. Since 
m
m 1 is strictly increasing in m,
which is strictly increasing in spriv, Private Signal Monotonicity holds. Public Signal
Monotonicity holds since F (jspub; `) =
R 1
spriv=0
F (jspriv; spub; `) dspriv.
2.1 Timing
We now describe each period in greater detail.
2.1.1 Period 1: Lending Stage
In period 1, the banks o¤er loans rst to remote agents and then to local agents. That
is, banks a and b rst make simultaneous and public loan o¤ers to agents who live in
regions B and A, respectively. These o¤ers can depend on an agents credit score 
and location `, which are all the banks know. The banks then make simultaneous
and public counter-o¤ers to agents who live in regions A and B, respectively. These
o¤ers can depend not only on  and `, but also on an applicants private type  and
her o¤er (if any) from her remote bank. Each agent then chooses which, if any, o¤er
to accept. As the banks are perfect substitutes from an agents point of view, an
agent will choose the bank that o¤ers her the lowest gross interest rate as long as it
does not exceed the project return .
Let xB` equal one if bank a chooses to compete for agents with credit score  in
location ` in region R and zero otherwise. Let rB` be the gross interest rate that bank
a o¤ers if xB` = 1. We assume this rate does not exceed the gross project return ,
since o¤ering a rate above  is equivalent to not making an o¤er. If the agent did not
receive an o¤er from bank a, then she is willing to pay bank b her gross project return
. Thus, with the convention that rB` equals  whenever bank a does not compete,
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rB` equals the willingness to pay of any agent. We assume there is an innitesimal
chance that the secondary loan market will be disrupted, forcing the bank to hold all
of its loans to maturity. Since only bank b observes an agents private type , this
implies that a threshold strategy is optimal: bank b will bid rB` (and win) as long as
an agents private type  exceeds a threshold B` of bank bs choosing. Otherwise,
bank b will not bid.
The banks swap roles with respect to agents who live in region A. Let xA` equal
one if bank b chooses to compete for agents in region A with credit score  and
location `, and zero otherwise. Let rA`   equal bank bs bid in period 1 if x` = 1;
set rA` =  otherwise. In period 2, bank a responds by choosing thresholds 
A
` such
that it will lend an agent in region A at interest rate rA` if and only if the agents
private type  exceeds A`.
Let CBa and X
B
a be the capital cost and realized value, respectively, of bank as
loans to region B:
CBa =
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
xB`H
 
B`j; `

dG (; `)
XBa =
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
xB`r
B
`
"
SB`
Z B`
=0
dH (j; `)
#
dG (; `)
Thus, CBa is the integral, over all credit scores  and locations ` in region B in which
the bank competes (i.e., for which xB` = 1), of the measure H
 
B`j; `

of borrowers
to whom bank a lends. Likewise, XBa is the integral, over all credit scores  and
locations ` in region B in which bank a competes, of the interest rate rB` charged to
these borrowers times their mean probability of repayment (the expression in square
brackets).
Likewise, let CAa and X
A
a be the capital cost and realized value, respectively, of
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bank as loans to region A:
CAa =
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
 
1 H  A`j; ` dG (; `)
XAa =
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
rA`
"
SA`
Z `
=A`
dH (j; `)
#
dG (; `)
The di¤erence between CAa and C
B
a reects the fact that bank a lends to borrowers in
region A whose private types exceed bank as minimum threshold A`, while it lends
to borrowers in region B if and only if (1) it chooses to compete for them (i.e., only if
xB` = 1) and (2) their private types are below bank bs minimum threshold 
B
`. This
also explains the di¤erence between XAa and X
B
a .
2.1.2 Period 2: Security Design Stage
In period 2, each bank designs one security. The number of shares of each security
is normalized to one. We describe this process from the point of view of bank a;
bank bs problem is analogous. First, bank a decides what portion of the loans of
each identiable group of borrowers to securitize: to include in the pool of assets
that underlie its security. Bank a does not know the private types of its borrowers
in region B. Hence, for any given credit score  and location `, it must securitize
the same proportion of loans to each type  2 0; B` of borrower in region B. Let
this proportion be pB`.
As for region A, since a borrowers private type  is observed by bank a but not
by the market, bank a will securitize a loan if and only if the borrowers private type
 is less than some threshold A`, which must be at least as high as the minimum
private type A` of borrowers in region A to whom the bank lends. The realized value
of bank as securitized loans is Ya = Y Aa + Y
B
a where
Y Aa =
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
rA`
"
SA`
Z A`
=A`
dH (j; `)
#
dG (; `) (2)
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is the realized value of the banks securitized local loans and
Y Ba =
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
pB`x
B
`r
B
`
"
SB`
Z B`
=0
dH (j; `)
#
dG (; `) (3)
is the realized value of the banks securitized remote loans. One obtains Y Aa from
XAa by replacing the supremum ` of private types  in X
A
a with the upper bound
A` on private types  who are securitized. Similarly, one obtains Y
B
a from X
B
a by
multiplying the integrand of the outer double integral in XBa by the proportion p
B
` of
loans that are securitized.
After choosing which loans to securitize, each bank i = a; b chooses a function 'i
which determines the ultimate payment per share made by the bank to a holder of
its security as a function of the realized loan repayments Yi of bank is securitized
borrowers. We call 'i (Yi) the payout of the security. As in DeMarzo and Du¢ e
[10], we assume that 'i is a nondecreasing function and that both the bank and the
market have limited liability: 'i (y) 2 [0; y] for all y  0.
There is symmetric information at the security design stage. Why? Let R (i)
denote the region in which bank i 2 fa; bg is located. While the thresholds R(i)` and

R(i)
` are the private information of bank i = a; b, the market can infer the values Y
A
i
and Y Bi of bank is securitized local and remote loans that result from each pair of
factor vectors
 
A; B

in the following way. First, we assume the market observes
the measure 1   H


R(i)
` j; `

of bank is local borrowers for each credit score 
and location `, as well as the proportion
H


R(i)
` j;`

 H


R(i)
` j;`

1 H


R(i)
` j;`
 of these borrowers
whom bank i securitizes. From these quantities, the market can infer the values
H


R(i)
` j; `

and H


R(i)
` j; `

of the distribution function H at the two thresholds.
We also assume that for each region R, the market observes the interest rates rR`, the
lending choices xR`, and the remote securitization proportions p
R
`. The market can
then use equations (2) and (3), or the corresponding equations for bank b, to compute
Y Ai and Y
B
i for any factor vectors 
A and B.
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2.1.3 Period 3: Signalling Stage
In period 3, the banks and investors rst see a common public signal  2 <M , with
unconditional distribution function 
. Each bank i then sees a private signal ui 2 <N+
of its local factor vector R(i) 2 (0; 1)K . The local factor vector R(i) and the local
signal ui are drawn from a joint density 

R(i); uij

, which can depend on the
public signal  as indicated by the notation. However, conditional on the public
information ,
 
A; ua

and
 
B; ub

are independent: the realization of
 
A; ua

adds no information about the distribution of
 
B; ub

and vice-versa. This is a
exible yet tractable way to permit common or correlated shocks to the two regions.
Let the distribution function of the private signal ui conditional on the public
signal  be 	(uij). We assume that for all public signals , private signals ui close
to the zero vector are observed with strictly positive probability:
inf

ui 2 <N+ : 	
 
uij > 0	 = 0:
Let  

R(i)jui; 

be the conditional distribution of the factor vector R(i) given
the private signal ui and the public signal . A higher private signal ui raises this
distribution in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance: if u0  u00, then for all
,   (ju0; )    (ju00; ). This implies that for any public signal , the worst news
bank i can get about its security payout 'i (Yi) occurs when its private signal u
i is
zero. Finally, we assume that the conditional distribution  

R(i)jui; 

is mutually
absolutely continuous with respect to the signals (ui; ).18
The assumption that the density  and distributions	 and   are region-independent
is for notational convenience. They could be replaced by R, 	R, and  R with no
change in the results, except for the proliferation of regional superscripts throughout
the paper.
After seeing their signals, the banks choose quantities of their securities to sell.
18This means that the set of realizations of the factor vector R(i) that can occur with positive
probability is independent of the signals ui and .
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Bank is quantity is denoted qi 2 [0; 1]. The market (which also sees the public
signal ) uses Bayess rule to assign a price pi = E ['i (Yi) jqa; qb; ] to the security of
bank i = a; b. This is a nonstandard signalling game since the market rationally uses
information about bank is quantity qi to infer information about bank is signal ui,
which may be relevant to the value of bank js security (as it may include some loans
to borrowers in bank is region).
2.1.4 Period 4: Settlement Stage
In period 4, each borrower repays her loan if and only if her project succeeds. These
repayments determine the value Yi of bank is loan portfolio. Bank i then pays the
liquidating dividend 'i (Yi) to its investors. While periods 1 through 3 occur at the
same point of real time, there is a unit of delay between periods 3 and 4.
2.2 Payo¤s
A borrower who pays interest rate r gets    r if her project succeeds and zero
otherwise. The banks are liquidity constrained: the discount factor of security buyers,
which we normalize to one, exceeds the discount factor of the banks, which is denoted
 2 (0; 1).19 The two banks have the same cost of capital, which is normalized to one.
In particular, suppose a bank lends c1 units of capital in period 1 to borrowers who
later repay the bank c4 in period 4. Assume, moreover, that investors pay the bank
c3 in period 3 in return for a security that obligates the bank to pay the investors
c04 in period 4. Then the payo¤ of investors in the banks security is c
0
4   c3, while
the banks payo¤ equals c3   c1 +  (c4   c04): its securitization proceeds c3, less its
capital cost c1, plus its discounted loan repayments c4, less its discounted payment
19This assumption, common in the prior literature, is thought to capture the typical reason cited
for why banks sell loans: the availability of attractive alternative investments together with the
existence of regulatory capital ratios (e.g., Gorton and Haubrich [16, §III.B]).
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c04 to holders of its security. We assume the investors have at least 2 in capital to
invest.20
2.3 Summary
We now briey summarize the key features of the model. We focus on region B;
analogous choices are made simultaneously in region A with the banksroles swapped.
Consider the group of agents with a given credit score  and location `. In period 1,
bank a either o¤ers each such agent a loan at the common interest rate rB` 2 [0; ] or
refrains from competing (whence we set rB` = ). Bank b then lends, at the interest
rate rB`, to those agents in the group whose private types exceed a threshold 
B
` of
bank bs choosing. Agents with lower private types accept as o¤er, if any.
In period 2, bank a chooses a proportion pB` 2 [0; 1] of its loans to the group
to securitize. Bank b securitizes its loans to group members whose private types
fall below a threshold B` of bank bs choosing Each bank i also species a payout
function 'i.
In period 3, each bank i = a; b sees a signal ui of its local factor vector and then
chooses a quantity qi 2 [0; 1] of shares to sell. The market rationally assigns a price
pi to bank is security using Bayess rule. In period 4, project returns are realized
and successful borrowers repay their loans. Each bank i then pays 'i (Yi) per share
to its security holders, where Yi equals the repayments of bank is securitized loans.
3 Base Model: No Securitization
We rst analyze a base model without securitization: banks must hold all of their
loans to maturity. Bank as payo¤ in the base model is simply its discounted loan
repayments less its cost of lent capital: E
 
XAa +X
B
a
 CAa  CBa . Bank bs payo¤
20Since each region has a unit measure of loan applicants, each with a project that returns  if it
succeeds, the securities of the two banks cannot be worth more than 2 to the market.
18
is analogous. In particular, if a bank lends, at a gross interest rate r, to a borrower
with credit score  and private type  living in location ` in region R 2 fA;Bg, its
expected prot is rE
 
SR`
   1: the discounted interest payment r times the
probability E
 
SR`

of project success, less the unitary cost of capital.
In the base model, banks lend only to local agents and extract the full surplus.
This is due to the winners curse: the banks have the same expected payo¤ from
lending to a given agent, but the agents local bank has superior information about
this payo¤. Since, by assumption, the local bank makes the second o¤er, it will
slightly underbid the remote bank on protable loans but refrain from bidding on
unprotable ones. Knowing this, a bank will not make any o¤ers to agents who are
not in its region.
Claim 4 Without the option of securitization, each bank lends only to agents who
reside in its own region. Moreover, each borrowers payo¤ is zero: the gross interest
rate on every loan equals the gross project return . An agent gets a loan if and
only if her discounted expected gross project return, E
 
SR`

, exceeds the banks
unitary cost of capital.
Without securitization, an agent gets a loan if and only her expected project
return exceeds a common threshold. Hence, the allocation of capital to projects is
e¢ cient: one agent receives a loan while another does not if and only if the rst
has a higher expected project return than the second. This e¢ ciency property will
not hold with securitization, since a bank may prefer not to lend to a creditworthy
agent whom it knows well. Intuitively, the banks private information about this
borrowers repayment probability worsens the lemons problem the bank faces in selling
its security.
Our conclusion that all lending is local and the loan allocation is e¢ cient relies on
our assumption that the remote bank makes the rst o¤er, followed by the local bank.
However, Sharpe [31] obtains the same result with the reverse timing. He assumes
19
that the remote bank sees not the local banks o¤er but rather its o¤er function: the
function from the local banks signal to its interest rate. If, in addition, the remote
bank has no private information about the applicant, then the local bank always posts
an o¤er function that is low enough to make it unprotable for the remote bank to
compete because of a winners curse (Sharpe [31, Proposition 2, p. 1078]).
4 Full Model
We now turn to the full model, with securitization. We rst show that the signalling
subgame has a unique separating equilibrium. We then derive formulas for a banks
benet of securitizing a given loan and of lending to a given borrower when securi-
tization is an option. Finally, we show that any equilibrium of the full model must
have a certain intuitive form. We then turn to several computed examples.
4.0.1 The Signalling Subgame
Let i (u
i; uj; ) = E ['i (Yi) jui; uj; ] be the expected payout of the security of bank
i 2 fa; bg, conditional on the signals. (jrefers to the other bank.) Let pi (qi; qj; )
be the price o¤ered by the market per unit of bank is security as a function of the
quantities of shares sold by the two banks and the public signal. Bank is expected
securitization prots i (ui; qi; ), conditional on its signal ui and quantity qi and the
public signal  equal the expectation (over all opposing signal vectors uj) of bank is
gross revenue qipi (qi; qj (uj) ; ) from selling qi units of the security less its discounted
expected payment to the buyers, qii (u
i; uj; ):
i
 
ui; qi; 

=
Z
uj2<N+
 
qi

pi
 
qi; qj
 
uj

; 
  i  ui; uj;  d	  uj :
Denition 5 A Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair (qa; qb) of measurable
quantity functions and a pair (pa; pb) of measurable price functions such that:
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1. for i = a; b, qi (ui; ) 2 argmaxq i (ui; q; ) almost surely;
2. for i = a; b, pi (qi (ui) ; qj (uj) ; ) = E [i (u
i; uj; ) jqi (ui) ; qj (uj) ; ] almost
surely;
The equilibrium is separating if, in addition,
3. for i = a; b, pi (qi (ui) ; qj (uj) ; ) = i (u
i; uj; ) almost surely.
We restrict to separating equilibria, which satisfy conditions 1 and 3 above. This
restriction uniquely determines the banks behavior and prots. Let bi (ui; ) =R
uj2<N+ i (u
i; uj; ) d	(ujj) and i (ui; ) = i (ui; qi (ui; ) ; ) be bank is expected
security payout and securitization prots, both conditioned only on bank is signal
ui and the public signal . (In general, i (ui; ) may depend on the equilibrium.)
The following characterization extends the result of DeMarzo and Du¢ e [10, eq. (4),
p. 79, and Prop. 10, p. 88], which assumes a single bank, to the case of two banks.21
Claim 6 The above double signalling game has a unique separating equilibrium. In
it, bank is expected securitization prots conditional on its signal ui and the public
signal  are i (ui; ) = (1  ) bi (0; ) 11  bi (ui; )  1  . Moreover, each bank is
optimal security design is debt: 'i (Yi) = min fmi; Yig for some mi 2 <+.
4.0.2 The Benets of Securitization
Consider either bank i 2 fa; bg. By Claim 6, the realized payout of the banks security
is min fmi; Yig where Yi = Y Ai + Y Bi is the realized value of bank is securitized loans
and mi is the face value (promised repayment) of the security. Consequently, the
expected payout bi (ui; ) of bank is security given its signal ui and the public signal
 is E [min fmi; Yig jui; ]. Bank is expected payo¤ i is the discounted expected
return of its loans, less its cost of lending, plus its net securitization prots. By
21It is easy to see that this result generalizes to any nite number of banks.
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Claim 6,
i = E
 
XAi +X
B
i
  CAi   CBi + (1  )E
 bi (0; ) 11 bi (ui; ) 1 
!
In order to understand bank is incentives to lend to a given agent, one must rst
consider its benet from securitizing the agents loan. To study this, we hold xed
the banks loan portfolio, and consider the e¤ect of adding a single innitesimal loan
to the banks security.
Suppose the recipient of this loan has credit score  and private type , and
lives in location ` in region R 2 fA;Bg.22 Let r be the gross interest rate that
she must pay if her project succeeds, which occurs with probability SR` . By
Claim 6, and the law of iterated expectations, bank is expected securitization prots
are (1  )E
h
E
bi (0; ) 11  bi (ui; )  1  i, where the outer expectation is taken
with respect to the public signal  and the inner conditional expectation is taken with
respect to the private signal ui. The e¤ect, on the banks prots i, of adding the
borrower to the banks security is thus
i = (1  )E
"
E
 bi (0; ) 11 bi (ui; ) 1 
 
bi (0; )bi (0; )   
bi (ui; )bi (ui; )
!
!#
: (4)
where for any quantity Q, Q denotes the change in Q that results from adding the
loan.
The terms bi (0; ) and bi (ui; ) measure the loans e¤ect on the expected
gross return bi (ui; ) = E [min fmi; Yig jui; ] of the security in two cases: when the
banks private signal is zero, and when it takes a generic value ui. In particular,
by Claim 6, adding the loan is benecial insofar as it raises the gross return of the
security in the worst case, or lowers it in the generic case. Since higher signals ui
entail higher values of Yi in a rst order stochastic dominance sense, bi (0; ) cannot
22We assume that the market knows the private type  since it can infer the set of private types
that each bank securitizes (p. 15).
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exceed bi (ui; ). Thus, roughly speaking, loans that shrink (raise) the gap betweenbi (ui; ) and bi (0; ) must raise (lower) the banks securitization prots.
The term bi (ui; ) = E [min fmi; Yigjui; ] measures the e¤ect of the loan
on the banks expected payment to its security holders, conditional on the signals ui
and . This e¤ect occurs entirely through the loans impact on the realized value
Yi of the banks securitized loans. First, the security defaults when its face value
mi exceeds the value Yi of the underlying loans. In this event, the loan raises the
security payout by Yi. Second, the loan lowers the chance of default by raising the
realized value of the loan portfolio Yi when this value lies slightly below the face value
of the security, mi. This e¤ect is approximately equal to the product of two terms:
the loss mi   Yi from default and the probability that Yi is slightly below mi. Since
both terms are close to zero, this second e¤ect is zero to rst order. Hence, the only
e¤ect is the rst:
bi  ui;  = E 1 (mi > Yi)Yijui;  ; (5)
where 1 (mi > Yi) equals one if mi > Yi (if the security defaults) and zero otherwise.
Finally, by (1), the increase in the value Yi of the underlying assets from adding
the borrower is a weighted sum of the macroeconomic factors Rk that a¤ect region R:
Yi = rS
R
` = r
KX
k=1
Rk`
R
k : (6)
Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) and using Claim 6, we nd that the e¤ect of securi-
tizing the additional borrower on the banks payo¤ is
i = r

R
i`; (7)
where

Ri` = E
 

Ri` ()

; (8)

Ri` () = E

i
 
ui; 
 j KX
k=1
Rk`

R0ik ()  Rik ()

;
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R0ik () = E
 
E

1 (mi > Yi) 
R
k
ui = 0;bi (0; )

!
,
and
Rik () = E
 
i (ui; )
E (i (ui; )j)
E

1 (mi > Yi) 
R
k
ui; bi (ui; )

!
:
By (7), prots from securitizing the loan are the product of four terms. The rst is
the gross interest rate r: ceteris paribus, it is more protable to securitize loans that
have a higher face value. The second is : it is more protable to securitize the loans
of borrowers with higher credit scores. The third is : borrowers with high private
types are also more protable. The nal term is 
Ri` which, by construction, must
equal the change in securitization prots from adding a loan for which the product
r of the rst three terms equals one.
By (8), 
Ri` is the expectation, over all public signals , of the change 

R
i` () in
securitization prots from adding a loan for which the product r = 1 and the public
signal is . 
Ri` (), in turn, is the product of the banks conditional (on the public
signal ) expected securitization prots E [i (ui; ) j] and the sum, over all factors
k, of the borrowers factor loading Rk` times the scaled di¤erence between two terms:
R0ik () and 
R
ik ().
The term R0ik () is the proportional increase in the lowest conditional expected
security payout, bi (0; ), that results from increasing the value Yi of the securitys
underlying assets by one dollar with probability Rk .
23 Thus,
PK
k=1 
R
k`
R0
ik () cap-
tures the additional loans proportional e¤ect on this worst-case security payout that
is due to the loadings Rk` of the borrowers repayment probability on various macro-
economic factors Rk . Likewise, 
R
ik () is a weighted average over signal vectors u
i of
the proportional increase in the conditional expected security payout bi (ui; ) that
results from increasing the value Yi of the securitys underlying assets by one dollar
with probability Rk . Thus,
PK
k=1 
R
k`
R
ik () captures the proportional e¤ect of the
23In the numerator of R0ik (s), the default indicator variable 1 (mi > Yi) is present because the
additional borrower a¤ects the security value only in the event of default.
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additional loan on this weighted average security payout that results from the loadings
of the borrowers repayment probability on the various macroeconomic factors that
a¤ect region R.
By Claim 6, for any public signal , the banks securitization prots are increas-
ing in the expected security payo¤ conditional on the worst signal vector ui = 0 and
decreasing in the expected security payo¤ for a generic signal vector ui. For this rea-
son, R0ik () enters positively in 

R
i` () while 
R
ik () enters negatively. The discount
factor  multiplying Rik () captures the banks preference for liquidity: the lower
is , the stronger are the banks liquidity needs, and thus the more likely it is that
securitizing the additional loan will be worthwhile.
The above results allow us to derive a concise expression for the total expected
gross return to bank i 2 fa; bg from lending to an agent with credit score  and
private type  who lives in location ` in region R 2 fA;Bg, when securitization is an
option. This expected return has two parts. The rst is the expected discounted
loan repayment by the borrower, rE
 
SR`

: the discounted interest rate r times
the probability E
 
SR`

that the loan will be repayed. The second is the value of
the banks option to securitize the loan. By (7), bank i earns an additional r
Ri`
from securitizing the agents loan, which it will do if and only if 
Ri` > 0. For any
real number c, let c+ denote the positive part of c: c+ = max f0; cg. The value of
the securitization option is r
 

Ri`
+
, so the banks gross return from lending to the
borrower is
r
h
E
 
SR`

+
 

Ri`
+i
: (9)
Bank i knows the private type  of the borrower only if she lives in the banks
home region. This is a disadvantage of remote lending. However, there is also
a potential advantage: the bank does not have private information about remote
shocks. Hence, it faces a lemons problem in reselling local loans but not remote
loans. In addition, the bank has a preference for liquidity:  < 1. For the last two
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reasons, it is always protable to securitize a remote loan:
Claim 7 Let i 6= j be the two banks. In any equilibrium, it is protable for bank i
to securitize all of its remote loans: 
R(j)i` > 0.
4.0.3 Main Results
We present results for region B. Identical results hold for region A upon replacing
awith band vice versa. Let rB` denote the deterring rate: the interest rate,
o¤ered by bank a, that makes bank b just willing not to lend to the agent with the
highest private type (for whom  = `) among those with credit score  living in
location ` in region B. By equation (9), bank bs gross expected return from lending
to this borrower at the interest rate r is r`
h
E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+i
. Setting this equal
to the banks unitary cost of capital and solving for r, we obtain the deterring rate:
rB` = (`)
 1
h
E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+i 1
> 0: (10)
Now consider the set of borrowers with credit score  in location ` in region B.
No Cream Skimming implies that if bank a competes for these borrowers, it prefers to
lend to all of them: to prevent bank b from skimming the best (highest-) borrowers
in the group. This requires bank a to bid an interest rate that is no higher than the
deterring rate rB` . In addition, bank a cannot charge more than the gross project
return , which is the most any borrower will pay. On the other hand, any interest
rate below the lesser of  and rB` permits bank a to capture all of the borrowers in
this group. Hence, if bank a competes for these borrowers, it will o¤er the interest
rate rB` = min

; rB`
	
. By equation (9), Claim 7, and the fact that E (j; `) = 1,
bank as prots from lending a unit of capital to this group are
B` = min

; rB`
	 
E
 
SB`

+ 
Ba`

   1: (11)
Our rst result, which does not assume Limit Irrelevance, is as follows.
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Theorem 8 Consider the group of agents with credit score  in location ` in region
B.
1. Suppose B` < 0. In this case,
(a) bank a does not compete for this group;
(b) if bank bs estimate  of an agents type  exceeds


h
E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+i 1
,
bank b o¤ers her a loan at an interest rate equal to the gross project return
, and the agent accepts.24 Else bank b does not o¤er the agent a loan.
Bank b securitizes all borrowers in this group to whom it lends if 
Bb` > 0
and none of them if 
Bb` < 0.
2. Suppose B` > 0. In this case,
(a) bank a o¤ers to lend to each agent in the group at the common interest
rate rB` = min

; rB`
	
;
(b) bank b makes no o¤ers to this group;
(c) all agents in the group accept bank as o¤er; and
(d) bank a securitizes all of them.
Consider the set of borrowers in a given location ` in region B. Theorem 8
characterizes the outcome, in the loan market, of borrowers with a given credit score
 in this set. It does not show how this outcome varies by the credit score . We
now turn to this important question.
The key di¢ culty is that bank as prot B` from lending is not necessarily
monotonic in the agents credit score . This prot is increasing in the deterring rate
rB` (equation (11)) which, in turn, is decreasing in the supremum ` of the agents
possible private types  (equation (10)). However, we have not specied how the
24By denition,  = E (jspriv ; spub ; `) (p. 9).
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supremum ` varies with the credit score . Limit Irrelevance pins this down in a
particular way: ` equals the inverse of the credit score .25 By (10), the deterring
rate, which we now call simply rB` , is independent of the credit score :
rB` =
h
E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+i 1
: (12)
We now present our second result.
Theorem 9 Assume Limit Irrelevance. Dene the threshold
B` =
1
min f; rB` g [E (SB` ) + 
Ba`]
: (13)
1. If  < B` , then 
B
` < 0: bank a does not compete for this group. If bank bs
estimate  of an agents type  exceeds


h
E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+i 1
= rB` =,
bank b o¤ers her a loan at an interest rate equal to the gross project return ,
and the agent accepts. Else bank b does not o¤er the agent a loan. Bank b
securitizes all borrowers in this group to whom it lends if 
Bb` > 0 and none of
them if 
Bb` < 0.
2. If  > B` , then 
B
` > 0: bank a o¤ers all borrowers in this group the same
interest rate min

; rB`
	
. Bank b does not compete and all agents accept bank
as o¤er. Moreover, bank a securitizes all loans to this group.
Proof. By Limit Irrelevance, ` = 1=, so rB` = r
B
` . By equations (11) and
(13), B` = =
B
`   1. Hence, B` ? 0 as  ? B` . The rest follows from Theorem 8
and equation (12).
Under Limit Irrelevance, bank a lends to an agent in region B if and only if her
credit score  exceeds the location-dependent credit threshold B` . This threshold is
decreasing in bank as securitization prots, as captured by
Ba`, and weakly decreasing
in bank bs securitization prots, as captured by
 

Bb`
+
. If bank as securitization
25This is because ` =  1 supsp r iv E [jspub ; spriv ; `] = 1.
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prots are low relative to those of bank b, it is harder for bank a to compete with
bank b. Bank a responds by competing for fewer borrowers in location `: it raises
its threshold.26
By part 2 of Theorem 9 and equation (12)), bank a o¤ers the interest rate
min

;
h
E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+i 1
if an agents credit score is above as threshold. This
is weakly decreasing in bank bs securitization prots, as captured by
 

Bb`
+
.27 In-
tuitively, if bank b is eager to securitize loans to the given location, then bank a must
o¤er a low interest rate in order to keep bank b out.
A key prediction of Theorem 9 is that a bank will use a credit score threshold in
deciding on remote loan applications. This feature survives a considerable weakening
of Limit Irrelevance. As long as bank as prot B` equals zero at a unique value of
, a threshold policy is optimal.28 By equations (10) and (11), a su¢ cient condition
for this is that ` - the maximum proportional increase in the agents expected type
 that comes from learning her private signal priv - be decreasing in . This seems
plausible; for instance, knowing that a loan applicant comes from a good family would
seem to raise her chances of repaying a loan by a smaller proportion if her credit record
is already quite strong.
5 Illustrations
We now discuss the implications of Theorem 9 for the e¤ects of securitization, com-
parative statics, and e¢ ciency under Limit Irrelevance. We illustrate these results
in a series of gures. The gures - but not the discussion - rely on the following
additional assumptions.
26This occurs, in particular, if location ` in region B has low loadings on factors about which bank
b will be well informed when it decides how much of its security to sell.
27By part 2 of Theorem 9 and equation (12)), bank a o¤ers the interest rate
28If it crosses zero, it must cross from below since B0` =  1.
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A1 Bank b would lend to some agents in the absence of securitization: its discounted
return E
 
SB`

from lending to the best agent (for whom  = 1) exceeds the
banks unitary cost of capital. By equation (12), this implies that the deterring
rate rB` is less than the gross project return , so bank a lends at the deterring
rate. Hence, by equations (12) and (13), bank as credit score threshold under
securitization is
B` =
E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+
E (SB` ) + 

B
a`
: (14)
A2 Bank b benets from securitization: 
Bb` > 0.
A3 Bank a benets more than bank b from securitization: 
Ba` > 

B
b`: Without this
condition, B`  1, so bank a will not lend in the location.
In Figure 1, each agent in the location corresponds to a point in the unit square.29
The agents credit score , which equals bank as estimate of her type , appears on
the horizontal axis. Bank bs estimate  of  appears on the vertical axis.30 While
bank a sees only an agents horizontal coordinate, bank b sees both.
In the absence of securitization, agents in areas A0 and A3 borrow from bank b at
the interest rate , while other agents do not get loans (Claim 4). With securitization,
agents in areas A3 and A4 borrow from bank a at the deterring rate rB` < , while
those in areas A0 and A1 get loans from bank b at the interest rate .
5.1 The E¤ects of Securitization
A comparison of Claim 4 and Theorem 9 reveals the following e¤ects of securitization,
which are discussed in section 1.
29The applicants are not uniformly distributed throughout the square.
30While the gure permits  and  each to take any value in the unit interval, some of these
values may have zero probability.
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Figure 1: E¤ects of Securitization under Limit Irrelevance. A given location ` in
region B is depicted. The credit rating  appears on the horizontal axis while bank
bs estimate  of an applicants type  is depicted on the vertical axis. The gure
assumes that E
 
SB`

> 1 and 
Ba` > 

B
b` > 0. Without securitization, applicants in
regions A0 and A3 receive loans from bank b at the interest rate . Those in regions
A1, A2, and A4 do not receive loans. With securitization, applicants in regions A3
and A4 receive loans from bank a at the interest rate rB` < . Applicants in regions
A0 and A1 receive loans from bank b at the interest rate , while applicants in region
A2 do not receive loans.
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1. Securitization Stimulates Lending. By connecting agents with liquid in-
vestors, securitization expands the set of borrowers.31 In Figure 1, areas A1
and A4 are added.
2. Securitization Favors Remote Lending. Remote bank a lends to location
` only if it can securitize its loans.
3. Remote Borrowers have Strong Observables but High Conditional
Default Rates. In Figure 1, the applicants who get remote loans are those
whose credit scores  exceed bank as threshold B` : they have strong observ-
ables. Now consider an otherwise identical neighborhood `0 in which the bank
as securitization prots 
Ba`0 are higher than in location `. This raises bank
as threshold: B`0 > 
B
` . The only applicants who are a¤ected are those whose
credit scores  lie between the two thresholds. In location `, these applicants
all get remote loans. In location `0 they get local loans, but only if bank bs
estimate  of their type is at least



E
 
SB`

+
 

Bb`
+ 1
> 0. Thus,
ceteris paribus, a remote borrower with a given credit score  has an expected
type  that is no higher, and sometimes strictly lower, than the expected type
of a local borrower with the same credit score.
4. Securitization Lets Borrowers with Strong Observables Get Cheap
Remote Loans. Securitization lowers the interest rate paid by agents with
high credit scores (above B` ) to min

; rB`
	
while leaving unchanged the in-
terest rate  paid by agents with lower credit scores.
5. Securitization Raises Conditional and Unconditional Default Rates.
Securitization expands lending to a set of borrowers (in Figure 1, those in areas
A1 and A4) whose expected types  are uniformly lower than those of agents
31All e¤ects described in sections 5.1 through 5.4 are intended in the weak sense: the set of
borrowers weakly increases, etc. In the gures, these e¤ects are strict.
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who borrow without securitization (those in areas A0 and A3). This raises both
conditional (on ) and unconditional default rates.
6. Securitized Loans Have Higher Conditional Default Rates then Re-
tained Loans. For any given credit score , securitized loans have higher
mean default rates than retained loans. More precisely, let us compare two
locations ` and `0 in region B. Assume bank b securitizes its loans to location
`0 but not to location `: 
Bb` < 0 < 

B
b`0. In all other respects, the two locations
are identical. The comparison is depicted in Figure 2. For credit scores below
B` , retained loans consist of area A0 in location `, while securitized loans consist
of areas A0 and A1 in location `. For each credit score, the securitized loans
have a lower conditional expected type  than the retained loans. For credit
scores above B` , all loans are securitized in both locations. Hence, for each
credit score  for which there are retained loans in one location and securitized
loans in the other, the latter group has a higher conditional default rate.
5.2 Higher Securitization Prots for the Local Bank
Suppose bank bs securitization prots rise from 
Bb` to e
Bb`. Since it is now harder
to deter bank b from cream-skimming, bank a does so less often: it raises its credit
score threshold from B` to eB` = E(SB` )+(e
Bb`)+E(SB` )+
Ba` (equation (14)). Theorem 9 implies
the following e¤ects, which are illustrated in Figure 3.
1. Relatively More Local Lending. Bank b lends more, while bank a lends
less. In Figure 3, Bank b picks up borrowers in areas A2 and A5. Bank a stops
lending to areas A4 through A6 and is left with only A7 and A8.
2. More Lending to Diamonds in the Rough. The set of borrowers grows to
include those with credit scores below as threshold B` , whose expected types
lie between bs new and old thresholds. This is area A2 in Figure 3. They are
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Figure 2: Retained Loans Have Lower Expected Default Rates. Two locations `
and `0 in region B are depicted. The credit rating  appears on the horizontal axis
while bank bs estimate  of an applicants type  is depicted on the vertical axis.
The gure assumes that E
 
SB`

= E
 
SB`0

, E
 
SB`

> 1, 
Ba` = 

B
a`0 > 0, and

Bb` < 0 < 

B
b`0. For credit scores below 
B
` , retained loans consist of area A0 in
location `, while securitized loans consist of areas A0 and A1 in location `. For
credit scores above B` , all loans are securitized in both locations. Hence, for each
credit score , retained loans (if there are any) have a higher expected type  than
securitized loans.
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Figure 3: E¤ect of Increase in Bank bs Securitization Prots from 
Bb` to e
Bb`. The
conditions of Figure 1 are assumed to hold before and after the increase, which raises
bank as threshold from B` to eB` . Bank a, which initially lent to areas A4 through
A8, now only lends to areas A7 and A8 and charges a lower interest rate to this group.
Bank b adds areas A2, A4, and A5 to its initial borrower pool of A0 and A1.
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diamonds in the rough: while their credit scores lie below bank as threshold,
their expected types are the highest among those who previously did not borrow.
3. Welfare Transfer from Good to Great Borrowers (in terms of observ-
ables). As bank a no longer competes for agents with credit scores between B`
and eB` , their interest rate rises from min; rB` 	 to . However, those with
scores above eB` see their interest rate fall since the rate bank a must o¤er to
deter bank b is now lower (equation (12)).
5.3 Higher Securitization Prots for the Remote Bank
Theorem 9 implies the following the e¤ects of an increase in bank as securitization
prots from 
Ba` to b
Ba`. These are illustrated in Figure 4, where bB` denote bank as
new, lower credit score threshold.
1. Relatively More Remote Lending. Bank a lends more, while bank b lends
less. In Figure 4, a picks up borrowers in areas A3 through A5, while b stops
lending to areas A3 and A4 and is left with only A0 and A1.
2. Applicants with High Credit Scores Benet from More Loans. The
set of borrowers grows to include those with credit scores between bank as old
and new thresholds (area A5 in the gure). Among agents who initially did not
get loans, these borrowers have the highest credit scores. These agents benet
since their interest rate, min

; rB`
	
, is lower than the project return .
5.4 E¢ ciency E¤ects
We next turn to the e¢ ciency e¤ects of securitization. In order for loans to be
allocated e¢ ciently within each location, a resident of location ` in region R must
get a loan if and only if her expected project return E
 
SR`

exceeds a location-
specic threshold cR` . In order for the allocation also to be e¢ cient across locations
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Figure 4: E¤ect of Increase in Bank as Securitization Prots from 
Ba` to b
Ba`. The
conditions of Figure 1 are assumed to hold before and after the increase, which lowers
bank as threshold from B` to bB` . Bank b ceases to lend to areas A3 and A4 and
now only lends to areas A0 and A1. Bank a adds areas A3 through A5, and A5 to its
initial borrower pool of A6 and A7. There is no change in the interest rates o¤ered
by the two banks.
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and regions, this threshold must not depend on the location ` or region R. This is
true without securitization, where the threshold cR` equals 
 1 (Claim 4).
It is useful to restate the condition for within-location e¢ ciency as follows: an
agent gets a loan if and only if her expected type  exceeds some location-specic
threshold ecR` .32 This holds without securitization, where only agents in areas A0 and
A3 get loans. However, with securitization it fails, since the threshold is zero if an
agents credit score exceeds B` and r
B
` = > 0 otherwise.
This discussion reveals two types of ine¢ ciencies that are caused by securitization.
1. Public Information Bias. Since bank a relies exclusively on public signals
to screen agents, there is an ine¢ cient bias towards agents whose public infor-
mation is strong. In Figure 1, agents near the top of area A2, who are turned
down by both banks, are of higher quality than agents near the bottom of area
A4, who get loans from bank a.
2. Securitization Prot Bias. E¢ ciency requires that a bank consider only an
agents creditworthiness. However, in equilibrium a bank also prefers agents
who are more protable to securitize. For instance, we can reinterpret Figure 3
as comparing two locations in region B, in which bank bs securitization prots
are 
Bb` and the higher value e
Bb`, respectively. Agents in the top of A2 in the
former location are turned down, while agents in the bottom of the same area
in the latter region receive funding. In Figure 4, agents at the top of area A5
are turned down when bank as securitization prots are 
Ba` while agents at
the bottom of the same area receive loans when these prots take the higher
value b
Ba`. In both cases, e¢ ciency requires the opposite.
32In particular, ecR` equals cR` E  SR`  1.
38
6 Related Literature
While prior models have studied the interaction between a single banks securitization
and lending decisions, ours appears to be the rst to study the e¤ect of securitization
on lending competition. We now discuss the relations between our work and this
prior research, as well as related work on security design and on lending competition
under adverse selection.
6.1 Lending with Securitization
Bubb and Kaufman [6] (BK) study a model with a single bank and a continuum of
loan applicants. The bank sees each applicants credit score. It can also engage
in costly screening, which reveals soft information about the applicant. Without
securitization, the bank lends to applicants with high scores and rejects those with
weak ones. It screens applicants with intermediate scores and lends to them if and
only if their soft information is positive. BK then introduce a monopsony loan buyer.
The buyer commits to buying a smaller fraction of loans to intermediate borrowers in
order to ensure that the bank will still screen them. In contrast, our model has many
small and unorganized security buyers, so such commitment is impossible. Rather,
a bank lends remotely in order to have less private information when it issues its
security. As a bank cannot discover a remote applicants soft information, remote
lending raises the default risk. In contrast, securitization does not raise defaults in
BK.
Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi [17] study the optimal design of mortgage-
backed securities by a lender who can exert costly hidden e¤ort to screen loan ap-
plicants. The model takes place in continuous time. Loans default according to a
Poisson process. The lender can lower the arrival rate of defaults at a cost. The
model is aspatial and features xed loan terms and a single bank. In contrast, ours
is a spatial model with endogenous interest rates and two competing banks. While
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they study moral hazard, our focus is adverse selection.
Heuson, Passmore, and Sparks [19] (HPS) study a model in which applicants have
a continuum of publicly observable default probabilities. A bank chooses whether to
lend to an applicant and, if so, whether to securitize the loan. An investor then sets
the minimum such probability to accept a loan for securitization. In response, the
bank retains the best loans, securitizes intermediate loans, and doesnt lend to the
worst borrowers. This mirrors the behavior of a bank towards its local applicants
in our model. While HPS study the problem of a single bank under symmetric
information, we assume two banks who face asymmetric information at both the
lending and securitization stages.
Chemla and Hennessy [7] (CH) also study a model of lending with securitization.
A bank can exert costly e¤ort to raise the chance that its loans will have a high return.
There are three types of investors. The rst group are uninformed risk-averse hedgers
for whom the banks security is a utility-enhancing hedge against future endowment
risk. CH o¤er the example of future home buyers: when the economy booms, few
borrowers default on their mortgages, so the security has a high payo¤; but the boom
also raises house prices, so investors need more money. The security thus hedges
against housing market risk. There is also a wealthy, risk-neutral speculator who
sees a signal of the assets type and can exert costly e¤ort to increase the precision of
this signal. Finally, there is a continuum of risk-neutral market makerswith deep
pockets.
For some parameters, the model has a pooling equilibrium in which the bank al-
ways securitizes all of its loans. It issues a senior tranche as well as an equity-like
mezzanine tranche that is attractive to the hedgers. The hedgersdemand stimulates
information acquisition by the speculator, since he can prot from the hedgersigno-
rance. The resulting informed speculation increases the correlation of the security
price with its true value, which gives the bank an ex ante incentive to screen. This in-
centive can actually be stronger than in the separating equilibrium in which the bank
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issues more shares when quality is low. Thus, CH argue that securitization without
retention does not necessarily worsen the moral hazard problem, since tranching can
lead to informative prices that give the bank an incentive to screen.
Shleifer and Vishny [33] analyze a model in which banks have private information
about loan quality (which is either high or low) and must retain a xed fraction of
the loan if they sell it. Loans are sold individually. Security prices are a¤ected
by investor sentiment. Since they assume symmetric information with irrational
investors, their model bears little relation to ours.
6.2 Security Design
Our paper is closely related to DeMarzo and Du¢ e [10] (DD). They study the
problem of a risk-neutral issuer who has a xed portfolio of long term assets. The
issuer designs a single security, which consists of a portfolio of assets to securitize and
a payo¤ function: a map from the nal value of this portfolio to the securitys payo¤.
The issuer then sees a private signal of the portfolios value and chooses a proportion
of the security to o¤er for sale to a continuum of uninformed, risk-neutral investors
who are more patient than the issuer. There is a unique separating equilibrium.
When the issuers signal is higher, it sells a lower proportion of the security and the
market responds with a higher price.
Signalling is costly since the issuer sells less of the security when the gains from
trade are greater. For this reason, the issuers goal at the design stage is to minimize
the sensitivity of its securitys payo¤ to its private information. DD show that
within the class of monotone, limited-liability securities, this sensitivity is minimized
by debt.33 Intuitively, debt pays its xed face value when the value of its underlying
portfolio exceeds this value. If the debt defaults, it pays the value of its underlying
portfolio, which is as close to its face value as limited liability will allow. Hence,
33A security is monotone and limit-liability if its payo¤ function ' : <+ ! <+ is nondecreasing
and satises ' (y) 2 [0; y] for each realization y of the nal value of the portfolio of securitized assets.
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the payo¤ function of debt is as at as possible within the class of monotone, limited
liability payo¤ functions.34
In DD, the issuers initial asset portfolio is taken as given. The theoretical
contribution of our paper is to derive this portfolio as the endogenous result of lending
competition. We assume two regional banks who compete for borrowers. The
outcome of this competition determines each banks loan portfolio, which it then
securitizes as in DD. Each bank has private information about local applicants at
the lending stage. This gives local banks an advantage in competing for loans. Each
bank also observes a private signal of its local macroeconomic conditions prior to
issuing its security. This creates a lemons problem that favors remote lending.
Since a banks security can contain a mixture of local and remote loans, a banks
macroeconomic signal contains information about the value of the other banks secu-
rity. Hence, the quantity that a bank chooses to sell acts as a signal of the values
of both bankssecurities. Nevertheless, DDs single-issuer result generalizes: there
is a unique separating equilibrium, in which each banks payo¤ is the same as in the
single-issuer case. Moreover, each bank issues debt. We use this result to derive
rich implications for the composition of each banks loan portfolio.
Like DD, we assume each bank issues at most one security. In contrast, DeMarzo
[9] studies the case of a risk-neutral issuer who designs one or more securities based
on a nite, exogenous set of assets. The issuer then sees signals of the nal values of
its assets and chooses how much of each security to sell. DeMarzo shows that pooling
the assets before designing the security has a cost and a benet for the issuer. The
cost is information destruction: pooling prevents the issuer from signalling positive
34Monotonicity is needed since the issuers signal is noisy. In particular, suppose the bank issues
a security that behaves like debt with one exception: its payo¤ falls slightly in particularly good
states. Assume these states have positive probability for intermediate signal values as well. Then
this change might lead to a smaller rise in the estimated security payo¤ as the issuers signal rises
from low to intermediate values. Hence, this security might be even less informationally sensitive
than debt.
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information for some securities and negative information for others. The benet is
diversication: if the assetsnal values conditional on the signals are not perfectly
correlated, then pooling them lowers the risk of security default. Whether pooling
is optimal depends on whether the diversication benet outweighs the information
destruction e¤ect.
Permitting multiple securities would have two e¤ects in our model. First, a banks
prots from securitizing its loans to a given location would depend on which of its
various securities it would optimally add the loans to. Second, in the issuance game
between the two banks, each bank would choose multiple quantities rather than a
single quantity. It seems unlikely that either of these changes would alter our basic
results. For simplicity, therefore, we follow DD in restricting each bank to a single
security.
Another way banks generate multiple securities is to issue multiple tranches of a
single loan portfolio. A bank may also be able to delay designing its security until
after it discovers its private information. DeMarzo [9] shows that these practices are
equivalent.35 While DDs [10] securitization prot function has a closed form solution,
DeMarzos [9] prot function depends on the solution to a di¤erential equation. This
makes it challenging to incorporate into our setting. However, the two functions have
some properties in common (DeMarzo [9, Lemmas 5 and 9]), so some of our ndings
might generalize. This might be an interesting question for future research.
Adverse selection in security issuance was rst analyzed by Myers and Majluf
[26]. They assume a rm must raise a xed amount of capital and focus on equity
issuance, while briey considering debt. Nachman and Noe [27] (NN) also assume
a xed amount of capital must be raised but allow for a full set of securities. They
give distributional conditions that are su¢ cient for a rm to issue debt. In their
35More precisely, delaying security design until after the (one dimensional) information is revealed
is equivalent to issuing an unlimited number of tranches (each of which has a monotone payo¤)
before the information is revealed.
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work, the security is designed ex post, while DD assume ex ante design. Axelson [2]
reverses the usual informational assumptions: investors are informed while the issuer
is not. Like DD and NN, he nds that debt is optimal.
Biais and Mariotti [3] (BM) modify DD in two essential ways. They assume that
security buyers have market power and thus earn positive prots. Moreover, they use
mechanism design to analyze the optimal trading mechanism, while DD assume that
it is a signalling game. BM also nd that the optimal security is debt. However, in
BMs optimal trading mechanism, all issuer types sell 100% of their securities. This
contrasts with DD, in which there is some retention.
Boot and Thakor [4] analyze a model in which a rm has various assets that it
wishes to sell, and investors can exert costly e¤ort to discover information about these
assetsvalues. There are noise traders, so gathering information can be protable.
Splitting the rms assets into two securities, one informationally sensitive and the
other not, stimulates trade, which gives investors an incentive to discover information
about the assetsvalues. This is protable for the issuer since it mitigates adverse
selection. The results of Chemla and Hennessy [7], discussed above, build on this
insight.
Demange and Laroque [11] and Rahi [29] study models in which a risk-averse
entrepreneur with a noisy private signal of the value of his projects designs and sells
securities. In these papers, unlike DD and ours, the issuer decides how much to issue
before observing her private information. The private information only permits the
issuer to earn trading prots afterwards.
6.3 Lending Competition with Adverse Selection
Our model is also related to prior research on lending competition with adverse selec-
tion in the absence of securitization. Perhaps the closest is Hauswald and Marquez
[18] (HM). HM assume that a banks cost of gathering soft information is greater
for more distant applicants. This is also true in our model, where the cost is zero
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for local applicants and innite for remote ones. Because banks know more about
local applicants, they lend at high interest rates to quality local applicants and o¤er
low interest rates to some remote applicants. In HM, the latter e¤ect occurs because
other banks - fearing a winners curse less - compete more aggressively for these re-
mote applicants. In our model, it is because o¤ering a lower interest rate prevents
cream-skimming by a remote applicants local bank. In both models, remote bor-
rowers default more since their lending banks have less information about their credit
quality.
In an earlier model, Sharpe [31] assumes that a banks soft information arises
endogenously from its prior loans to applicants. Because of a winners curse, banks
that lack this information do not lend to mature applicants. Analogously, in our
model all lending is local if banks cannot securitize. Finally, in Broecker [5], each
bank sees a noisy private signal of each loan applicants type. Since a bank attracts
only those borrowers who are turned down by banks that o¤er lower rates, a bank
that charges a high rate tends to get low quality applicants. Similarly, remote banks
in our model charge low interest rates in order to avoid cream-skimming by better
informed local banks.
7 Conclusions
The model of DeMarzo and Du¢ e [10] assumes a single issuer who designs a single
security. The issuer then sees private information about this securitys value and
chooses how much to sell. In equilibrium, the issuer varies the amount that it sells
in order to signal the securitys value. This is costly for the issuer since it must sell
less of the security when the gains from trade are higher. In order to minimize these
costs, the issuer designs a security that is not very sensitive to its private information.
In DeMarzo and Du¢ e [10], the issuers initial portfolio of assets is exogenous.
This is an important limitation: in practice, a banks lending behavior may be
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inuenced by its expected prots from securitizing its resulting loan portfolio. We
study this issue in a rich setting in which regional banks rst compete for borrowers
and then design and issue securities based on their resulting loan portfolios.
As in prior models, we nd that securitization expands lending by connecting
liquid investors with loan applicants. However, we also nd that securitization creates
a bias towards remote loans, which can be securitized without contributing to a
banks lemons problem. Moreover, since banks lack soft information about remote
applicants, remote borrowers tend to have stronger observables than local borrowers.
In addition, banks must o¤er lower interest rates to remote applicants in order to
prevent cream skimming by the applicants local banks. Thus, remote loans will
have lower interest rates than local loans, and securitization strengthens the negative
relation between a borrowers public information and the interest rates she pays.
Since banks lack soft information about remote applicants, they do not screen as
well when lending remotely. Hence securitization, which stimulates remote lending,
raises borrowers conditional and unconditional default rates. Moreover, in cross
section, securitized loans will have higher default rates conditional on observables
since banks lower lending standards more in local areas that are more protable to
securitize. As detailed in section 1, all of our predictions are consistent with prior
empirical research.
While securitization has the potential to raise social welfare by connecting liquid
investors with worthy loan applicants, this is tempered by two ine¢ ciencies. The rst
is public information bias: since the remote bank relies exclusively on observables,
there is an ine¢ cient bias towards applicants with strong observables such as credit
scores. This is ine¢ cient as these applicants are favored over creditworthy applicants
with weak observables.
The second ine¢ ciency is securitization prot bias. E¢ ciency requires that only
the most creditworthy applicants get loans. However, with securitization banks also
prefer applicants who enhance the value of their security. One reason can be that the
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bank is not well acquainted with the applicants local macroeconomic environment.
In this case, the applicants loan does not add much to the lemons problem the bank
will face in selling its security. Another is that the applicant has a good chance of
repaying her loan in bad macroeconomic states. By raising the payout to investors
when the security defaults, these borrowers raise the securitys value, which translates
into greater securitization prots. However, since all participants are risk neutral, it
is ine¢ cient to favor these borrowers.
A Proofs
Proof of Claim 1: Let ` = supspub  (spubj`), ` = infspub  (spubj`), spub ;` =
infspriv  (sprivjspub; `), and spub ;` = supspriv  (sprivjspub; `). Integrating by parts,
 (spubj`) =
Z

dF (jspub; `) =
 
Z

d (1  F (jspub; `)) =
Z

(1  F (jspub; `)) d:
Hence, @
@spub
 (spubj`) equals  
R

@F(jspub ;`)
@spub
d which, by Public Signal Monotonicity,
exists and lies in
R

 () d;
R

 () d

. In addition,
E (jspriv; spub; `) =
Z

dF (jspriv; spub; `) =
 
Z

d (1  F (jspriv; spub; `)) =
Z

(1  F (jspriv; spub; `)) d:
Thus, @
@spriv
E (jspriv; spub; `) =  
R

@F(jspriv ;spub ;`)
@spriv
d which, by Private Signal Monotonic-
ity, exists and lies in
R

 () d;
R

 () d

. Since  2 (0; 1), the slope of  (sprivjspub; `)
lies in <++. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 2: The proof of Claim 1 implies that (a)  (spubj`) has a di¤er-
entiable inverse function spub (j`) of , which is a bijection from


`
; `

 [0; 1] to
(0; 1) whose slope lies in <++ and (b)  (sprivjspub; `) has a di¤erentiable inverse func-
tion spriv (jspub; `) of , which is a bijection from

spub ;`; spub ;`

 0;  (spubj`) 1
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to (0; 1) whose slope lies in <++. We now extend the function spub (j`) to all
pairs (; `) in (0; 1)  [0; 1] by dening it as one if  > supspub  (spubj`) and zero if
 < infspub  (spubj`). By Claim 1,
G (0; `0) = Pr (spub < spub (0j`) and `  `0) =
Z `0
`=0
Z spub (0j`)
spub= 1
f (spub; `) dspubd`:
Hence, g (0; `0) =
@2G(0;`0)
@0@`0
= f (spub (0j`0) ; `0) @spub (0j`0)@0 where f (spub (0j`0) ; `0)
denotes the marginal density f (spub; `) evaluated at (spub (0j`0) ; `0). Since (0; `0)
is feasible, infspub  (spubj`0) < 0 < supspub  (spubj`0), whence spub (0j`0) lies in (0; 1)
by Claim 1. Thus, f (spub (0j`0) ; `0) 2 <++ by assumption. Claim 1 implies further
that @spub (0j`0)
@0
2 <++. Thus, g (0; `0) 2 <++ as claimed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 3: First,
H (0j0; `0) = Pr ( (sprivjspub; `)  0jspub = spub (0j`0) ; ` = `0)
= Pr (spriv  spriv (0jspub; `) jspub = spub (0j`0) ; ` = `0)
= F (spriv (0jspub; `) jspub (0j`0) ; `0) :
Hence,
H (j; `) = F (spriv (jspub; `) jspub (j`) ; `) ,
H 0 (j; `) = F 0 (spriv (jspub; `) jspub (j`) ; `) s0priv (jspub; `) , and
H 00 (j; `) = F 00 (spriv (jspub; `) jspub (j`) ; `)

s0priv (jspub; `)
2
+F 0 (spriv (jspub; `) jspub (j`) ; `) s00priv (jspub; `) :
Di¤erentiating the identity  (spriv (jspub; `) jspub; `) =  with respect to ,
1 =  0 (spriv (jspub; `) jspub; `) s0priv (jspub; `) and
0 =  0 (spriv (jspub; `) jspub; `) s00priv (jspub; `)
+ 00 (spriv (jspub; `) jspub; `)

s0priv (jspub; `)
2
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so that
s0priv (jspub; `) = [ 0 (spriv (jspub; `) jspub; `)] 1 = [ 0 (sprivjspub; `)] 1 and
s00priv (jspub; `) =  
 00 (sprivjspub; `)
[ 0 (sprivjspub; `)]3
:
Accordingly,
H 00 (j; `) 
H 0 (j; `) =

F 00

s0priv
2
+ F 0s00priv


F 0s0priv
=
F 00
F 0 0
  
00
[ 0]2
:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 4: Consider, for instance, bank a. If it competes for a borrower in
region B, it must make the rst o¤er. It does not know the borrowers private type .
Since bank b knows , bank b can tell which of bank as o¤ers are protable for bank
a and which are not. However, in the absence of securitization the two banks have
common values: the value of lending to a borrower is simply her discounted expected
repayment less the common cost of capital. Thus, bank b will slightly underbid bank
as protable o¤ers and refrain from bidding on the unprotable ones. As a result,
bank a will succeed in lending only to unprotable borrowers. Knowing this, bank a
will not make o¤ers to any agents who reside in region B in period 1. But given this,
in period 2 bank b can charge the maximum possible interest rate of  and any of
these agents will agree. It will do so if the resulting discounted expected repayment,
E
 
SR`

, exceeds its unitary cost of capital. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 6: Equilibrium requires that bank a does not want to change its
strategy taking bank bs strategy qb as given. Dene
Pa (q; ) =
Z
ub2<N+
pa
 
q; qb
 
ub

; 

d	
 
ubj
and
a (u
a; ) =
Z
ub2<N+
a
 
ua; ub; 

d	
 
ubj :
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Integrating conditions 1 and 3 over bank bs possible signal vectors ub, we nd
that, almost surely, bank as optimal quantity q maximizes q [Pa (q; )  a (ua; )]
and Pa (qa (ua; ) ; ) equals a (ua; ). These are the conditions for a separat-
ing equilibrium of the single-sender game analyzed by DeMarzo and Du¢ e [10, p.
77]. By their Proposition 2 [10, p. 78], bank a sells a quantity qa (ua; ) =hba (0; ) =ba (ua; )i 11  and the expected market price when bank a sells a quan-
tity q is Pa (q; ) = ba (0; ) =q1 . The quantity and expected price of bank as
security thus does not depend on bank bs strategy since ba (ua; ) does not. Hence,
DeMarzo and Du¢ es equation (4) [10, p. 79] implies that in any separating equilib-
rium, bank as securitization prots conditional on the signals ua and  are given by
 (ua; ) = (1  ) ba (0; ) 11  ba (ua; )  1  as claimed.
It remains to show that bank as optimal security is debt. Following DeMarzo
and Du¢ e [10, pp. 88-89], let 'a () be any monotone security. Since Ya is nonde-
creasing in each factor Ak , for each public signal  the lowest possible realization
of E ('a (Ya) jua; ) is E ('a (Ya) jua = 0;). Now consider a standard debt security
min fma; Yag. By the dominated convergence theorem, E (min fma; Yag jua = 0;)
is continuous in ma, so we may choose ma so that E (min fma; Yag jua = 0;) =
E ('a (Ya) jua = 0;). Let d (Ya) = 'a (Ya) min fma; Yag and  (ua; ) = E (d (Ya) jua; );
by construction,  (0; ) = 0. Because 'a (Ya)  Ya, for Ya  ma we have d (Ya) =
'a (Ya)   Ya  0. Moreover, for Ya  ma, d (Ya) = 'a (Ya)   ma, which is nonde-
creasing in Ya. Hence, there is a y 2 [ma;1) [ f1g such that d (Ya) > 0 if and
only if Ya > y. Moreover, since the measure of agents is 2 and each is willing to pay
at most , Ya is bounded by 2. Let  (yjua; ) be the conditional density of Ya at
the realization y given the signals ua and . Since the conditional (on ua and ) dis-
tribution of a is mutually absolutely continuous with respect to ua, the conditional
density has a well dened Radon-Nikodym derivative (yju
a;)
(yj0;) for each public signal
. As noted by DeMarzo and Du¢ e [10, p. 88, n. 30], the measure  can be chosen
so that the Radon-Nikodym derivative (yju
a;)
(yj0;) is nondecreasing in y. Thus, for any
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signal vector ua,
 (ua; ) = E (d (Ya) jua; ) =
Z 2
y=0
d (y) (yjua; ) =
Z 2
y=0
d (y)
 (yjua; )
 (yj0; )  (yj0; ) dy

Z 2
y=0
d (y)
 (yjua; )
 (yj0; )  (yj0; ) dy =
 (yjua; )
 (yj0; )
Z 2
y=0
d (y) (yj0; ) dy = 0
Thus, E ['a (Ya) jua; ] = E [min fma; Yag jua; ] + (ua; )  E [min fma; Yag jua; ].
Hence, by switching from the security 'a (Ya) to the security min fma; Yag, the bank
weakly lowers ba (ua; ) (the expected payout of the security conditional on ua and
) while not changing ba (0; ), thus weakly raising conditional prots  (ua; ) and
thus unconditional prots E [ (ua; )]. This shows that the optimal security is debt.
Q.E.D.
For the remainder, we need additional notation. Let zB` = r
B
`p
B
` denote the
product of the interest rate charged to region B borrowers with credit score  in
location ` and the proportion of these loans that are securitized. This quantity,
which must lie between zero and rB`, can be interpreted as the amount of loans that
bank a securitizes, expressed in units of the face value rB` of these loans. Given r
B
`,
choosing pB` is clearly equivalent to choosing z
B
`. With this change of variables,
Y Ba
 
B

=
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
xB`z
B
`
"
SB`
Z B`
=0
dH (j; `)
#
dG (; `) : (15)
Bank as Lagrangean equals its expected payo¤ a plus constraint terms, which
we write in a manner analogous to the integrals that appear in a:
L = a +
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
 
a`z
B
` + b`
 
rB`   zB`


 
1 H  B`j; ` dG (; `)
+
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
"
c`r
A
`
Z `
=A`
dH (j; `) + d`rA`
Z A`
=A`
dH (j; `)
#
dG (; `)
where a`, b`, c`, and d` are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints zB`  0,
zB`  rB`, A`  `, and A`  A`, respectively. For technical reasons, we omit
the constraint rB`   and verify later that it holds. Bank bs Lagrangean, which is
analogous, is omitted.
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Proof of Claim 7: W.l.o.g. let i = a and j = b. Since uA and B are independent
conditional on ,
E

1 (ma > Ya) 
B
k
ua;  = Z
B
Bk
Z
A
1
 
ma > Y
B
a
 
B

+ Y Aa
 
A

d 
 
Ajua;  d   Bj ;
where  
 
Bj is the distribution function of B conditional on . By stochastic
dominance, the interior integral is nonincreasing in ua, so the double integral is as
well. But stochastic dominance also implies ba (0; )  ba (ua; ). Hence B0ak () 
Bak () for all public signals , which proves that 

B
a` () > 0 since  < 1. Hence,

Ba` = E
 

Ba` ()

> 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 8: the proof consists of the following claims.
Claim 10 If bank a competes for region B borrowers with credit score  in location
`, it bids a strictly positive interest rate rB`.
Claim 11 If bank a competes for customers with credit score  in location ` in region
B, then it includes all of them in its security: if xB` = 1, then p
B
` = 1.
Claim 12 Consider the group of agents with credit score  living in location ` in
region B. Given the interest rate rB` o¤ered by bank a, bank b responds as follows.
1. It lends to all agents whose private type  exceeds
B` = min

`; `r
B
` =r
B
`
	
: (16)
In particular, it strictly prefers (not) to lend when a borrowers private type 
exceeds (respectively, is less than) `rB` =r
B
`, and is indi¤erent when  equals
this expression.
2. If bank b lends to some region B borrowers in this group (i.e., if B` < `),
then it securitizes all of these borrowers if 
Bb` > 0 and none of them if 

B
b` < 0.
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Claim 13 If bank a competes for region B borrowers with credit score  in location
` (if xB` = 1), it o¤ers the interest rate r
B
` = min

; rB`
	
and lends to all borrowers
in this group. If rB`  , then bank b is just willing not to bid for the best borrower
in this group: the borrower whose private type  is `. If rB` > , bank b strictly
prefers not to bid for any borrowers in the group.
Claim 14 Bank a competes for region B borrowers with credit score  in location `
(i.e., it sets xB` = 1) if and only if
rB`

E
 
SB`

+ 
Ba`

 > 1: (17)
This concludes the proof of Theorem 8. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 10: Suppose otherwise: rB` = 0. Since r
B
` = 0, @X
B
a =@x
B
` = 0 and
@Y Ba =@x
B
` = 0 (since z
B
`  rB`). Hence,
@L
@xB`
= E
 
@XBa
@xB`
!
  @C
B
a
@xB`
+ (1  )E
 
@
@xB`
ba (0; ) 11 ba (ua; ) 1 
!
=  @C
B
a
@xB`
< 0:
Thus, xB` = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 11: The rst order condition for zB` is
0 = E
0B@ ba (0; ) 11 ba (ua; ) 1 
0B@E

1 (ma > Ya)
@Ya
@zB`
ua = 0;ba (0; )   
E

1 (ma > Ya)
@Ya
@zB`
ua; ba (ua; )
1CA
1CA
+(a`   b`) g (; `)
Z B`
=0
dH (j; `)
However,
1
g (; `)
R B`
=0 dH (j; `)
@Ya
@zB`
= xB`S
B
` = x
B
`
KX
k=1
k`
B
k
Hence,
b`   a` =
8<: 0 if xB` = 0
Ba` if xB` = 1 (18)
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By Claim 7, 
Ba` > 0, whence b`   a` > 0 if xB` = 1. But a` and b` are the
Lagrange multipliers for the constraints zB`  0 and zB`  rB`, respectively. Thus,
by Claim 10, either a` or b` must be zero. Together with (18), this implies that
b` = 

B
a` > 0 = a`, so 0 < z
B
` = r
B
`. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 12: The derivatives of the banks prots b and the Lagrangean
L with respect to B` are
@b
@B`
= rB`
B
`H
0  B`j; ` g (; `) 
Bb` (19)
and
@L
@B`
= rB`
B
`H
0  B`j; ` g (; `) 
Bb` + d`   c` : (20)
Since this must equal zero, it follows that
c`   d` = 
Bb`: (21)
The derivatives of the banks prots b and the Lagrangean L with respect to B`
are
@b
@B`
=
 
1  E  rB`B`SB`   rB`B`
Bb`H 0  B`j; ` g (; `) (22)
and
@L
@B`
=
@b
@B`
  d`rB`B`H 0
 
B`j; `

g (; `) : (23)
First, suppose B` = `. Then 
B
` = ` as well, so
@b
@B`
 0 and @b
@B`
+ @b
@B`

0. (The latter condition means that it is not optimal for the bank to lower both
B` and 
B
` while keeping them equal.) These two inequalities hold if and only if
1  E  rB``SB`   rB``  
Bb`+  0 which holds if and only if rB`  rB` by (10).
This conrms that (16) holds when B` = `.
Now suppose B` < `. Recall that c` and d` are the Lagrange multipliers
for the constraints B`  ` and B`  B`, respectively. Only one of these can
bind since B` < `. Hence, either c` or d` is zero. Thus, by (21), c` =
 

Bb`
+
while d` =
  
Bb`+. Hence, bank b securitizes all of its borrowers in the group
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(c` > 0) if 
Bb` > 0, and none of them (d` > 0) if 

B
b` < 0, as claimed. Moreover,
by (21), (22), and (23), 0 = 1  E  rB`B`SB`   rB`B`  
Bb`+, which is equivalent
to B` = `r
B
` =r
B
`. This shows that (16) holds when 
B
` < ` as well. Hence, (16)
always holds. Finally, since only bank b knows , it strictly prefers (not) to lend to
borrowers whose types  exceed (respectively, are less than) `rB` =r
B
`. Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 13: The Lagrangean is not di¤erentiable at the optimal interest
rate rB`. Hence, to nd this optimal rate, we must consider the part of the Lagrangean
in which rB` or 
B
` (which depends on r
B
`) appears. It is
E
 
XBa
  CBa + (1  )E
 ba (0; ) 11 ba (ua; ) 1 
!
+
Z 1
`=0
Z 1
=0
Z B`
=0
 
a`z
B
` + b`
 
rB`   zB`

dH (j; `) dG (; `) :
In addition, since the choice of rB` does not a¤ect terms that involve credit scores
0 6=  and locations `0 6= `, the optimal rB` is chosen to maximize
E
 
SB`


Z B`
=0
rB`dH (j; `) 
Z B`
=0
dH (j; `)
+ (1  )E
 ba (0; ) 11 ba (ua; ) 1 
!
+
Z B`
=0
 
a`z
B
` + b`
 
rB`   zB`

dH (j; `) :
Now, since @Ya
@rB`
= @
@rB`
R B`
=0 x
B
`z
B
`dH (j; `) g (; `)SB` ,
@
@rB`
 
(1  )E
 ba (0; ) 11 ba (ua; ) 1 
!!
=
@
@rB`
 Z B`
=0
zB`dH (j; `)
!
g (; `) 
Ba`:
By Claim 11, a` = 0 and b` = 
Ba` > 0. Hence, r
B
` is chosen to maximize
c 1
Z B`
=0
 
rB`   c

dH (j; `) d= c 1I  rB` (24)
where c 1 = 

E
 
SB`

+ 
Ba`

is independent of rB`. If r
B
` < r
B
` , by (16), 
B
` equals
` so small changes in rB` do not a¤ect it. Hence, (24) is strictly increasing in r
B
`,
so the optimal rB` is at least min

; rB`
	
.
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If rB`  , we are done. If rB` < , it su¢ ces to show that the optimal rB` is no
greater than rB` . Let us write r = r
B
`, r
 = rB` , and H () = H (j; `) for brevity,
and let S  [0; `] be the support of  for the given values of  and `. Consider any
r > r. We will show that if I (r) > 0, then I 0 (r) < 0. By (16), B` = `r
=r < `,
so
I (r) =
Z `r=r
=0
(r   c) dH () =
Z
2[0;`r=r]\S
(r   c) dH () (25)
With the change of variables x = r, I (r) = 1
r
R
x2[0;`r]\S0 (x  c)H 0
 
x
r

dx where
S 0 = fx 2 [0; r] : x=r 2 Sg is the support of x. Thus,
I 0 (r) =   1
r2
 Z
x2[0;`r]\S0
(x  c)
"
H 0
 
x
r

+H 00
 
x
r

x
r
H 0
 
x
r
 #H 0 x
r

dx
!
:
Changing variables back,
I 0 (r) =  1
r
 Z
2[0;`r=r]\S
(r   c)

H 0 () +H 00 () 
H 0 ()

dH ()
!
: (26)
For any functions '0 () and '1 (), let E
 ('0) and Cov
 ('0; '1) denote the expec-
tation of '0 and covariance of '0 and '1, both conditional on  2 [0; `r=r] \ S.
Then I 0 (r) =  1
r
E (xy)H (`r=r), where x () = r   c and y () = H0()+H00()H0() .
By denition of covariance, Cov (x; y) = E (xy)   E (x)E (y). Rearranging,
E (xy) = Cov (x; y) + E (x)E (y). Since I (r) > 0, E (x) > 0. By No Cream
Skimming, E (y) > 0 and Cov (x; y)  0. This proves that E (xy) > 0, so
I 0 (r) < 0 as claimed.
Finally, by Lemma 12, B` = min

`; `r
B
` =r
B
`
	
. Substituting for rB`, 
B
` =
min

`; `r
B
` =min

; rB`
		
= `: bank b does not lend to any borrowers in this
group. Moreover, by Lemma 12, bank b strictly prefers (not) to lend to borrowers
whose types  exceed (respectively, are less than) `rB` =r
B
`. If r
B
`  , then
rB` = min

; rB`
	
= rB` : bank b is just willing not to bid for the best borrower in
this group: the borrower whose private type  is `. If rB` > , then r
B
` =  < r
B
` :
bank b strictly prefers not to bid for any borrowers in the group. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Claim 14: If the bank competes for these borrowers, then (a) by Claim
11 it securitizes every borrower who accepts (i.e., zB` = r
B
`) and (b) by Lemma 12,
it outbids bank b for all borrowers in this group: B` = `. By di¤erentiating
the Lagrangean L with respect to xB`, one can easily verify that competing for these
borrowers (setting xB` = 1) raises bank as prots if and only if (17) holds. Q.E.D.
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